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Security matters when it comes to investment decisions. In-
deed, capital owners prefer to invest where crime rates are lower
because the likelihood of being deprived of the return on their
investment is lower.1 Adjacent local authorities, responding to those
preferences, compete by investing in law enforcement to lower their
respective crime rates, and to make their jurisdiction relatively safer
than others for investors. Understanding the mechanics of such com-
petition and the choice of law enforcement chosen by adjacent juris-
dictions is the focus of this paper.
In the United States, there are many cases of ‘‘twin” cities, with
similar characteristics, which nevertheless exhibit very different
crime rates. For example, the crime rate against properties is 60%
higher in Minneapolis than in St-Paul, 100% higher in Tampa than
in St Petersburg, and 46% higher in Oakland than in San Francisco.2
Many potential explanations for the concentration of criminal activ-s of business are less willing to 
lers and high end restaurants 
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s), East St-Louis (Illinois) and ities has been suggested. Freeman et al. (1996) and Helsley and
Strange (1999) suggest that congestion in enforcement can explain
these phenomena, as more criminals can dilute the probability of
capture and conviction. Many economists like Sah (1991), Glaeser
et al. (1996) or Silverman (2004), argue that social interactions of
some form or another contribute to the presence of multiple equilib-
ria in crime rates. In particular, Zenou (2003) proposes that a crim-
inal life becomes more attractive in high crime rate communities.
Drawing from both of these potential explanations, there also exists
a large body of literature on the ‘‘broken window” effect; see Lochner
(2007) and Rosado (2008). Frictions in the labor market could be an-
other mechanism. Burdett et al. (2003) generate the co-existence of
high-crime/low-wage regions with low-crime/high-wage ones be-
cause ﬁrms in low crime areas can offer higher wages. Schrag and
Scotchmer (1994), Verdier and Zenou (2004), Curry and Klumpp
(2009) and O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010) all suggest that discrimina-
tion and prejudices may play an important role in creating disparity
in crime rates among populations.3 One of the main three contribu-
tions of our paper is to propose a new explanation for this concentra-
tion in criminality, based on the interaction between crime, capital
location, wages and enforcement.
When security levels differ, capital owners will adjust their
investments in consequence; when crime becomes more concen-
trated, capital may also becomes more concentrated, although3 O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010) also incorporate the fact that non criminals may
outbid criminals to be able to live in crime and drug free environments.
5 See the survey by Wilson (1999).
6 This is unconditionally satisﬁed for a wide variety of production functions, like
the Cobb–Douglas production function KbL1b. In other cases, some restrictions need
to be imposed; with the CES production function [Kr + Lr]1/r, this condition is satisﬁed
as long as inputs are not too complementary—i.e. r is not too small. Even when the
condition is not generally satisﬁed, restricting the upper bound for K would be
sufﬁcient; this is equivalent to assuming free disposal of capital since investments
become undesirable beyond that point.
2obviously in different locations. Another important feature of our
analysis is that residents of a jurisdiction make the choice between
legal and illegal activities.4 For an individual, this occupational
choice largely depends on the amount of capital—a complement in
production—in the jurisdiction in which he or she resides: more cap-
ital increases wages, but also translates into a higher reward for
criminal activities. Since investment in capital in a particular juris-
diction depends on the crime rate in that jurisdiction, there is a com-
plex bi-directional relationship between investment and crime. By
adding occupational choice to the otherwise classic problem of cap-
ital location, we can create agglomeration effects, both for crime and
capital.
The key mechanism in our analysis can be explained as follows:
In standard models without occupational choices, the unit return
of capital in a given jurisdiction is a decreasing function of the
stock of capital. With occupational choice, an extra unit of capital
may lead to more individuals choosing to become workers (rather
than criminals), and this in turn can make capital more productive.
It follows that if an extra unit of capital sufﬁciently increases the
number of workers (and decreases the number of criminals), then
the unit return of capital may well be an increasing function of the
stock of capital located in a jurisdiction. Of course, whether the
unit return of capital is an increasing or a decreasing function of
capital affects the allocation of capital in an important way. With
declining unit returns, capital will tend to be equally distributed.
However, with increasing unit returns, capitalists will ﬁnd it
advantageous to concentrate their capital in a single jurisdiction.
Consequently, our model is able to explain the concentration of
criminal activities in one location, and the concentration of capital
investments and high wages in another location. In particular, our
model predicts that jurisdictions with larger endowments in capi-
tal can more easily maintain lower crime rates. This suggests some
degree of persistence in crime rates, something supported by the
data as shown by Stahura and Huff (1986).
The second main contribution of our paper is connected to the
literature on regional competition and capital allocation. Our mod-
el predicts that jurisdictions with larger endowment in capital may
in fact be able to attract new capital more easily. Initial gaps in cap-
ital allocation may not be closed with capital mobility, and may in
fact be accentuated instead. This is a departure from the traditional
literature involving capital mobility, like the tax competition liter-
ature for example. As Cai and Treisman (2005) pointed out how-
ever, convergence is far from being the norm when it comes to
capital allocation. As it was the case for concentration in crime
rates, there is also no consensus on the underlying reasons of the
concentration of capital; see Duranton and Puga (2004) for a de-
tailed survey of the literature. For example, Cai and Treisman
(2005) explain this lack of convergence as resulting from techno-
logical differences making it easier for some jurisdictions to attract
mobile capital. Differences in crime rates generated by residents’
occupational choices generate similar effects in our paper.
Finally, our last main contribution is to study competition in
law enforcement across jurisdictions within this context. The nat-
ure of the law enforcement game between jurisdictions is also very
different depending on whether the per unit return of capital is
decreasing or increasing with investment. For the case of an
increasing per unit return on capital, we show that no pure strat-
egy equilibrium exists for simultaneous games. Interestingly, look-
ing at sequential games not only allows us to solve for pure
strategy equilibria, but also allows us to discover that the welfare4 The interaction between crime and occupational choice has been examined in a
number of papers, e.g. Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1993), Acemoglu (1995), Baland
and Francois (2000), _Imrohorog˘lu et al. (2000), and Lloyd-Ellis and Marceau (2003).
However, none of these papers account for capital investment and inter-jurisdictional
competition.properties of such types of equilibria are quite different. In partic-
ular, law enforcement choices may not be inefﬁcient. While there
is an extensive literature on capital tax competition,5 the literature
on competition in crime deterrence is more limited. Marceau (1997)
and Wheaton (2006) for example, both concentrate directly on the
competition between regional governments. However, many fea-
tures of decisions made by competing governments are similar to
the one faced by competing private agents. Clotfelter (1978), Shavell
(1991), Hui-Wen and Png (1994), Helsley and Strange (1999) or
Hotte and Van Ypersele (2008) all investigate these issues. All those
papers have one thing in common, they all demonstrate that the
‘‘laissez-faire” equilibrium could feature a level of law enforcement
greater than the socially efﬁcient level. In the current paper, we
show that equilibria with efﬁcient enforcement by all regions also
exist. The nature of the competition in law enforcement we face in
this paper, also relates well to the current literature on tax competi-
tion with discontinuity, as in Konrad and Kovenock (2009) or
Marceau et al. (2010).
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a
model with mobile capital and occupational choice. Private sector
behavior is described in Section 3 and the enforcement policies
chosen independently by the jurisdictions are characterized in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we explore the consequences of relaxing some
important assumptions of our model. Allowing for mobility is the
one that generates the most important results. We analyze work-
ers’ and criminals’ mobility separately. While neither types of
mobility change the essence of our argument, workers’ mobility
makes it more likely for agglomeration effects to be present, and
criminal’ mobility makes it less likely. Finally, we conclude in
Appendix.
2. The model
There are two jurisdictions, a and b. The aggregate production
function in each jurisdiction i 2 {a, b} is given by F(Li, Ki), where
Li and Ki are the labor force and the capital in place in Jurisdiction
i, respectively. The properties of F are standard: FK > 0, FL > 0,
FKK < 0, FLL < 0, and FLKP 0, where Fh = @F(Li,Ki)/@h and Fhj = @2F(Li,
Ki)/@h@j. We assume that total return to capital is always increasing
in the stock of capital: @(K FK)/@K = FK + KFKK > 0.6
In each jurisdiction, the population consists of a continuum of
agents of measure 1, each of whom chooses to become either a
worker or a criminal. If Li is the number of workers in Jurisdiction
i, then the number of criminals in this jurisdiction is Ci = 1  Li.7 An
individual who chooses to become a criminal steals part of the total
return on capital.8 The proportion of the total return on the capital a
criminal is able to steal is denoted by a. Thus, an agent who decides
to become a criminal obtains aKi FK(Li, Ki). Alternatively, if he chooses
to become a worker, he is paid according to the marginal product of
labor, which amounts to a payoff given by FL(Li, Ki).
A large number of atomistic capitalists endowed with a total of
K units of mobile capital choose to allocate their capital between7 In reality, few individuals specialize solely in criminal activities. For a discussion
on this topic, see Blumstein et al. (1986). However, to keep our model as simple as
possible, we decided to assume that agents choose one of the two activities, as in
Murphy et al. (1993).
8 Obviously, criminals could also steal part of the return to labor. Without altering
the fundamental nature of our problem, this would add its share of complication. To
keep our analysis as transparent as possible, we abstract from this possibility.
3the two jurisdictions. The amount of capital invested in Jurisdiction
a is denoted Kam, and K
b
m ¼ K  Kam is that invested in Jurisdiction b.
Capital is allocated by the owners after the choice of law enforce-
ment by each government. The governments are assumed to be
committed to their enforcement policy. Once capital is allocated,
it becomes completely immobile. We also assume that in each of
the two jurisdictions, immobile capital owners already have some
capital in place. Denote by Kio the total amount of capital already in
place in Jurisdiction i. Each of those capital owners are identical to
the owners of mobile capital in all aspects, except for the fact that
they cannot choose where to locate their capital. This distinction
between mobile and immobile capital is often used in the tax com-
petition literature, as in Janeba and Peters (1999) or in Marceau
et al. (2010). Note that in Section 5.1, where we discuss the dy-
namic implications of our model, the difference between mobile
and immobile capital will become clearer. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that Kao P K
b
o P 0.
In Jurisdiction i, the government chooses the level of law
enforcement, di, which it can buy at a cost of 1 per unit. Law
enforcement positively affects the probability P(di) of arresting
criminals, where P0 0(di) < 0.9 Criminals are subject to sanction S,
which is exogenously given, and is the same in both region. Govern-
ments ﬁnance their expenditures di by use of a pure lump sum tax.
Governments are assumed to maximize total output net of
enforcement costs. This implies that all residents and both mobile
and immobile capital owners are treated equally. This is consistent
with all capital owners residing in the region where their capital is
employed. Alternatively, governments could only care for work-
ers—by maximizing wages—, or for capital owners—by maximizing
the return on capital. At the limit, governments could maximize le-
gal output—i.e. output minus what is appropriated by criminals.
This would be consistent with governments caring for everyone
but the criminals. All of these alternative objective functions would
generate slightly different tradeoffs, but the general results of the
paper would qualitatively remain the same.
The timing is as follows. First, jurisdictions simultaneously
choose their level of law enforcement. This investment is perfectly
observable and is irreversible. Then, capitalists allocate their mo-
bile capital between the two jurisdictions. Investments in capital
are perfectly observable and irreversible. The residents of each
jurisdiction then make their occupational choice (worker or crim-
inal). Finally, production takes place, theft takes place, and pay-
ments are awarded. The model is solved using backward
induction. In Section 5, we discuss the issue of mobility, and so this
timing will be altered accordingly.
3. Private sector behavior
3.1. Occupational choice
We solve for the occupational choice equilibrium of the resi-
dents of Jurisdiction i for given levels of enforcement di and capital
Ki ¼ Kio þ Kim. Since agents choose the activity that generates the
largest payoff, the equilibrium number of workers in Jurisdiction
i, say Li(Ki, di), is such that the returns on both occupations are
equalized. Thus, Li(Ki, di) solves the following equation:
FLðLi;KiÞ ¼ aKiFKðLi;KiÞ  PðdiÞS: ð1Þ9 In a previous version of this paper, we assumed that law enforcement not only
deters crime, but could also reduce a. Obviously, this gives additional incentives to
invest in law enforcement, but all results remains qualitatively the same. For
simplicity, and to keep in line with the classical literature on law enforcement, we
have chosen to ignore this additional effect in this version. In Section 5, we further
discuss alternative forms of enforcement.In other words, the number of workers must adjust so that the
wage, which is simply the marginal product of labor FL(), is equal
to the return to criminal activity, aKFK() net of the expected pun-
ishment. When FL(0,K) > aK FK(0, K)  P(di)S, some individuals be-
come workers (L > 0). Similarly, FL(1,K) < a K FK(1,K)  P(di)S is
required for some individuals to become criminals (L < 1). We as-
sume that both conditions are satisﬁed for the relevant range of
K. Given these two conditions, and given that the left hand side
of Eq. (1) is monotonically decreasing, while the right-hand side
is monotonically increasing with L, the solution to Eq. (1) is unique
and denoted Li(Ki, di).
On the one hand, an increase in Ki generates an increase in the
wage a worker receives, provided that FLK() > 0. On the other hand,
an increase in Ki translates into an increase in KiFiK , the total return
on capital. Since the return to criminal activity is a proportion of
this total return, an increase in Ki also leads to an increase in the
return to criminal activity. The relative size of each effect deter-
mines whether an increase in Ki leads to more workers or to more
criminals. To see this, note that from Eq. (1), we have:
@LiðKi;diÞ
@Ki
¼ FLKðL
i;KiÞ  a½FKðLi;KiÞ þ KiFKKðLi;KiÞ
aKiFLKðLi;KiÞ  FLLðLi;KiÞ
ð2Þ
The denominator of this last expression is positive, while the
sign of its numerator is ambiguous. Thus, the impact of a change
in the capital stock K on equilibrium employment L depends on
the sign of FLK  a[FK + KFKK]. This implies that when FLK > (resp.
<) a[FK + KFKK], then labor (resp. criminality) increases when capital
increases. The incentive for a resident to participate in the legal
sector increases only if the wage increase due to additional capital
is large enough. Note that for the particular case of FLK() = 0, an
increase in capital leads to an increase in criminal activity for the
recipient jurisdiction. An increase in law enforcement effort di
unambiguously reduces the incentive to become a criminal, and
consequently increases the labor supply, i.e. @Li(Ki, di)/
@di = P0(di)S/[aKFKL  FLL] > 0.
Consider now the following condition:
Condition I: FLK(Li, Ki)P a[FK(Li, Ki) + KiFKK(Li, Ki)], "
Ki 2 ½Kio;Kio þ K and " Li 2 [0,1].
Condition I guarantees that @Li(Ki, di)/@KiP 0. Intuitively, Condi-
tion I requires that the increase inwages following the arrival of new
capital dominates the increase in the return on criminal activities.
We now turn to the characterization of the capital location choice,
with particular attention paid to potential agglomeration effects.
3.2. Capital location choice and agglomeration effects
The mobile capitalists allocate their K units of capital between
the two jurisdictions. Denoted by qi(Ki, di) is the per unit return
on capital invested in Jurisdiction i. Since a proportion a of the total
return on capital is stolen by each criminal, we get qi(Ki,
di) = [1  aCi(Ki, di)]FK[Li(Ki, di), Ki]. In a standard model of capital
location with no crime, the per unit return on capital in a given
jurisdiction decreases with the investment, because the marginal
product of capital is itself a decreasing function of capital. More-
over, if both jurisdictions differ only in terms of their initial stock
of capital, the jurisdiction with less capital will initially attract
more mobile capital. In fact, provided that there is enough mobile
capital, and that technologies are identical, marginal products and
capital stocks will be equalized in the two jurisdictions. No
agglomeration would occur in such a case.
In the literature, agglomeration effects are sometimes intro-
duced directly by assuming that the technology exhibits increasing
returns in capital, as in Boadway et al. (2004), but more interesting
are the cases in which agglomeration effects arise endogenously.
Duranton and Puga (2004) surveyed the literature on agglomera-
Fig. 1. Case with @qi/@Ki < 0 and da = db.
10 The derivation of Condition II can be found in Appendix A.
4tion effects, and classiﬁed them as coming from three different
channels: from the sharing of resources or gains, from the
improvement in matching and ﬁnally, from learning. In the case
of our paper, agglomeration effects arise from sharing the gains
of specialization. When Condition I is satisﬁed, more capital im-
plies that more residents specialize in legal production, which it-
self contributes to attract more capital. Residents then share the
beneﬁt of higher wages (and a higher return on ﬁx factors).
In the current framework, the return to capital in the two juris-
dictions will differ because enforcement may differ between the
two jurisdictions. More importantly, it will also differ because
the number of criminals will vary relatively to the size of the
investment in capital. Consider ﬁrst the difference in enforcement
between jurisdictions. Enforcement is good for capitalists because
it reduces the amount of the return on capital that is stolen by
criminals, and it is also good because it deters individuals from
becoming criminals. Ceteris paribus, a jurisdiction with more
enforcement will attract more capital. Consequently, two jurisdic-
tions could end up with different levels of capital simply because of
differences in their choice of enforcement. Of course, despite differ-
ences in capital allocation, no agglomeration effect is at work here.
If da > db, Jurisdiction a will attract more capital, but capital will
still be allocated to the point where the per unit return in one juris-
diction is equal to the per unit return in the other jurisdiction, pro-
vided the marginal return on capital is decreasing in capital.
The effect of the stock of capital on the per unit return on capital
in a given jurisdiction is much more interesting. The impact of a
change in capital on this per unit return is given by:
@qiðKi;diÞ
@Ki
¼ aFKðÞ@L
iðKi;diÞ
@Ki
þ ½1 aCiðKi;diÞ FKKðÞ þ FLK ðÞ@L
iðKi;diÞ
@Ki
" #
:
ð3Þ
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) shows that when
Ki changes, the number of criminals changes; this change in the
number of criminals will affect the proportion of the total return
of capital that is stolen. The second term represents the more tra-
ditional impact of a change in Ki on the per unit return, but with
one difference. When capital in Jurisdiction i increases, the mar-
ginal return on capital decreases; this is captured by FKK() < 0.
However, when capital increases, the number of workers also
changes, and so does the marginal return of capital through the
cross effect FLK()@Li()/@Ki. Consequently, when more capital leads
to more workers, the per unit return on capital invested in Jurisdic-
tion imay be an increasing function of the stock of capital invested
in i. Intuitively, because the labor supply and the crime rate both
depend on the amount of capital located in a jurisdiction, it is pos-
sible for the per unit return on capital to increase when capital
investment increases. A larger number of workers translates into
a larger marginal product of capital. Furthermore, when the num-
ber of workers increases, the number of criminals is reduced and
this also leads to an increase in the total return on capital.
Below, we show that the sign of @qi(Ki, di)/@Ki is a key determi-
nant of the equilibrium allocation of capital. We focus on two sim-
ple cases: (a) @qi(Ki, di)/@Ki < 0 "Ki; and (b) @qi(Ki, di)/@Ki > 0"Ki. We
also brieﬂy discuss the case in which the sign of @qi(Ki, di)/@Ki varies
with Ki. It should be obvious that when Condition I is not satisﬁed,
the per unit return on capital decreases with the stock of capital.
Denoted by K(da, db) is the equilibrium capital investment in
Jurisdiction a, while the equilibrium capital investment in Jurisdic-
tion b is given by K  Kðda; dbÞ.
Proposition 1. Whenever Condition I is not satisﬁed, the equilibrium
capital investments K(da, db) in Jurisdiction a, and K  Kðda; dbÞ in
Jurisdiction b are given by the solution to:½1 aCaðdaÞFK ½LaðdaÞ;Kao þ Kðda; dbÞ
¼ ½1 aCbðdbÞFK ½LbðdbÞ;Kbo þ K  Kðda; dbÞ: ð4Þ
Under this type of equilibrium, K(da, db) is an increasing function of da,
and a decreasing function of db.
All proofs can be found in Appendix A. Proposition 1 is easily
understood by an examination of Fig. 1. When Condition I is not
satisﬁed, the net returns on capital, qa and qb, are both decreasing
in capital. Capital owners prefer to invest in the jurisdiction in
which the per unit return on capital is the highest. The more capital
owners invest in a given jurisdiction, the lower the per unit return
on capital is. In equilibrium, capitalists allocate their capital so that
the per unit return in both jurisdictions is equalized, which is rep-
resented by K(da, db) in Fig. 1. Note that for a given level of enforce-
ment chosen by the other jurisdiction, an increase in enforcement
by a jurisdiction leads to an increase in capital invested on its ter-
ritory. Consequently, both jurisdictions will compete to attract cap-
ital investment by offering a secure environment to the capitalists.
Thus, this environment entails no agglomeration effects; it follows
that Condition I is a necessary condition for the presence of
agglomeration effects. In such a case, K(da, db) is an increasing func-
tion of da and a decreasing function of db.
Furthermore, Condition I (i.e. labor supply being increasing in
capital), is not a sufﬁcient condition for the presence of increasing
returns to investment. What is in fact required is that labor supply
increases at a high enough rate. The following condition, Condition
II, is the sufﬁcient condition for the per unit return on capital to be
increasing with the stock of capital10:
Condition II:
aCiFKLðLi;KiÞ > a½FKðLi;KiÞ þ KiFKKðLi;KiÞ
þ FLLðL
i;KiÞFKKðLi;KiÞ  FKLðLi;KiÞ2
aFKðLi;KiÞ
;
8Ki 2 Kio;Kio þ K
h i
and 8Li 2 ½0;1:
Obviously, for Condition II to be satisﬁed, Condition I itself has
to be satisﬁed. In addition, three are three other requirements.
First, labor supply, and by consequence criminality, must be
responsive enough to changes in capital, which is obtained when
FLK is large. Second, criminality must have a sufﬁcient impact on
Fig. 2. Case with @qi/@Ki > 0 and q Kao;d
a 
> q Kbo; d
b
 
.
5capital owners, and therefore aCi must also be large enough. For
example, without crime, Condition II cannot be satisﬁed. Finally,
as seen in the last term on the right hand side of Condition II ,
the more concave the production function is, the harder it is for
Condition II to be satisﬁed. With a highly concave production func-
tion, the beneﬁt associated with a reduction in criminality is unli-
kely to overcome the traditional decreasing marginal return to
capital. Note that if @Li/@Ki > 0, but FLK is not large enough to ensure
that @qi(Ki,di)/@Ki > 0—i.e. Condition II is not satisﬁed—then the
resulting equilibrium will be similar to that described in Proposi-
tion 1. To summarize, under Condition II, the per unit rate of return
on capital is increasing in capital: @qi(Ki, di)/@Ki > 0. Proposition 2,
which we now introduce, deals with the possibility of increasing
return on capital or agglomeration effects and describes an equilib-
rium in which all mobile capital is invested in a single jurisdiction.
Proposition 2. Whenever Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, there exists
at least one equilibrium in which all mobile capital is invested in one
jurisdiction. In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which all
mobile capital K is invested in Jurisdiction a if qa(Ka, da)P qb(Kb, db),
and one in which all mobile capital K is invested in Jurisdiction b if
qb(Kb, db)P qa(Ka, da).
When the per unit return on capital qi(Ki, di) is increasing with
investment, then capitalists beneﬁt from concentrating their capi-
tal in a single jurisdiction.
The question then becomes: Which jurisdiction will obtain the
mobile capital? Unfortunately, the answer is neither simple nor
unique. Two types of problems arise. First, coordination is an issue.
As we can clearly see it in Fig. 2, there can exist up to three equi-
libria: a globally stable equilibrium, a locally stable equilibrium,
as well as an unstable equilibrium. For obvious reasons, we chose
to ignore the unstable equilibrium in the rest of this paper. Out
of the two stable equilibria, the globally stable equilibrium yields
a higher total payoff. However, because there are a large number
of independent capitalists who choose to invest their capital simul-
taneously, it is conceptually quite possible that they could coordi-
nate on the ‘‘wrong” jurisdiction, i.e. a jurisdiction in which total
payoff is not maximized. For convenience, we only focus on the
globally stable equilibrium, one in which capitalists coordinate
on the jurisdiction in which total payoff is maximized.11 The second
problem is to identify the jurisdiction which is the most attractive
for capital owners. As previously discussed, both the enforcement ef-
fort and the initial capital inﬂuence the per unit return on capital.
Enforcement effort has a positive effect on the per unit return on
capital, and so does the initial capital stock when Condition II is sat-
isﬁed. Consequently, we can derive the following result.
Corollary 1. When the two jurisdictions have the same initial
endowment in capital (Kao ¼ Kbo), there exists an equilibrium in which
all mobile capital K is invested in Jurisdiction a if da > db, and one in
which all mobile capital K is invested in Jurisdiction b if da < db. If
da = db, then Kðda; dbÞ ¼ K with probability q, and K(da, db) = 0 with
probability (1  q) is an equilibrium allocation for any q 2 [0,1].
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the net returns on capital, qa and qb, are
both increasing in capital. Given an equal initial capital allocation,
if the level of enforcement is larger in Jurisdiction a, then mobile
capitalists prefer to concentrate their capital in that particular
jurisdiction. Naturally, all the capital is invested in Jurisdiction b11 Note that we could have ensured that the payoff maximizing jurisdiction is
chosen by assuming a unique mobile capital owner or, alternatively, by assuming that
a large number of capital owners make their location choices sequentially. Finally,
note that when qa(Ka, da) = qb(Kb, db), the two stable equilibria are identical, and so we
could imagine that one is randomly selected.if da < db. If both jurisdictions provide the same level of enforce-
ment, the capitalists are then indifferent between concentrating
their capital in one jurisdiction or the other . Again, to simplify,
we assume that all capital owners pick Jurisdiction a with proba-
bility p. Initial capital endowment also plays a role in determining
where mobile capital will locate.
Corollary 2. When the two jurisdictions have the same level of
enforcement effort (da = db), there exists an equilibrium in which all
mobile capital K is invested in Jurisdiction a if Kao > K
b
o, and one in
which all mobile capital K is invested in Jurisdiction b if Kao < K
b
o. If
Kao ¼ Kbo, then Kðda; dbÞ ¼ K with probability q, and K(da, db) = 0 with
probability (1  q) is an equilibrium allocation for any q 2 [0,1].
Abstracting from possible differences in enforcement levels, the
jurisdiction with more initial capital will attract all mobile capital.
This is simply because the per unit return of capital is larger in the
jurisdiction with more initial capital. In such an environment,
agglomeration effects are at work. Not only does all mobile capital
locate in the same jurisdiction, but it also does so in the jurisdiction
which has the largest initial capital stock.
Note that the locational choice of mobile capital in the case in
which a given jurisdiction has both more initial capital and exerts
more enforcement effort is obvious, whereas that in which one
jurisdiction dominates in one aspect and not in the other is more
complicated. Nevertheless, agglomeration effects are still at work.
4. Enforcement policies and capital allocation
We now examine the choice of law enforcement by the two
jurisdictions. Both jurisdictions are assumed to maximize a general
welfare function X[L, K, d], which includes enforcement costs. For
example, governments could maximize total output net of enforce-
ment costs. This would imply that workers, criminals and both
immobile and newly arrived mobile capital owners would be trea-
ted equally. Alternatively, one can imagine that governments only
care about workers, or only about workers and immobile capital
owners. The last two examples are often used in the tax competi-
tion literature. This function X is assumed to be differentiable and
strictly concave in enforcement effort. Thus, the problem of Juris-
diction a for any db is given by:
max
da
X½Laðda; dbÞ;Kao þ Kðda;dbÞ; da ð5Þ
where La(da, db) = La[K(da, db), da]. The problem of Jurisdiction b can
be obtained by simply interchanging a and b in Eq. (5) above.
Fig. 3. The payoffs.
6The resulting Nash equilibrium outcomes are strikingly differ-
ent depending on whether Conditions I and II apply. When Condi-
tions II is not satisﬁed, the per unit return on capital is decreasing
in capital, agglomeration effects are not present, and capital is
allocated to the point where its per unit return is equalized in all
jurisdictions, as stated in Proposition 1. Under reasonable assump-
tions about the welfare function, this corresponds to the situation
described in Marceau (1997), Helsley and Strange (1999) and in
other papers we discussed in the introduction. Each jurisdiction
inefﬁciently exerts too much effort in enforcement. Such a result
is also reminiscent of those obtained in the literature on policy
competition between governments.12 By increasing enforcement,
a region attracts some capital, but it imposes a negative externality
on the other jurisdictions which lose some capital. Using the termi-
nology of Eaton and Eswaran (2002) and Eaton (2004), the actions of
the regions would need to be plain substitutes. In such a case, both
jurisdictions will choose a level of enforcement larger than the efﬁ-
cient level (i.e. too much investment compared to what a central
authority would select if it maximized the sum of both objective
functions). Note that because enforcement is inefﬁcient, so are occu-
pational choices: in other words there are too few criminals in this
world.
When Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, mobile capital locates in
a single jurisdiction. In such an environment, the nature of the
game between the jurisdictions is very different. For immediate
purposes, we deﬁne X[Ki, di] =X[Li(Ki, di), Ki, di] which describes
the payoff of jurisdiction i when Ki units of capital locate on its
territory, and when it invests di in enforcement. We shall deﬁne
d Kio
 
as the level of enforcement chosen by jurisdiction i
when no mobile capital is located on its territory: dðKioÞ ¼
argmaxdX½Kio; d. Similarly, let dðKio þ KÞ denote the level of
enforcement chosen by a jurisdiction when all the mobile capital
locates on its territory: dðKio þ KÞ ¼ argmaxdX½Kio þ K; d.
Condition III: Both dðKioÞ and dðKio þ KÞ are assumed to be
increasing in Kio. Moreover, d
ðKio þ KÞ > dðKioÞ.
Under this condition, the region with more capital has more
incentive to invest in enforcement. This condition holds for a wide
range of objective functions, including the three mentioned above
with only minor assumptions about the production function. If we
ignore the competition to attract mobile capital, the region en-
dowed with more capital would have higher enforcement and a
lower crime rate. To characterize the competition game to attract
mobile capital, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne d^ðKoÞ as the level of enforce-
ment solving X½Ko þ K; d^ðKoÞ ¼ X½Ko; dðKoÞ. Fig. 3 depicts the
payoffs of the jurisdictions in this law enforcement game. Fig. 3
shows that d^ðKoÞ > dðKoÞ is deﬁned as the enforcement level such
that a jurisdiction is indifferent between attracting mobile capital
but at the cost of over-investing in law enforcement, and not
attracting the mobile capital while choosing the optimal enforce-
ment. Clearly, it must be that d^ðKioÞ > dðKio þ KÞ > dðKioÞ, and
the following chain of inequalities must hold:
X Kio þ K;d Kio þ K
 h i
> X Kio;d
 Kio
 h i
¼ X Kio þ K; d^ Kio
 h i
> X½Kio;d 8d – d Kio
 
:
A jurisdiction never chooses enforcement higher than d^ðkioÞ; the
jurisdiction would be better off choosing dðKioÞ and obtaining no
mobile capital. We can also easily see from Fig. 3 that a larger
endowment of capital Kio implies a higher d^ðKioÞ. The region that
started with more capital is willing to go farther when it comes
to law enforcement. This will be very important in characterizing
the equilibrium policies. Similarly, a jurisdiction never chooses a12 See, for example, Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Wildasin (1988), Wilson (1986,
1999), or Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).strategy d < dðkioÞ. For the game considered, a strategy for a juris-
diction is simply a level of enforcement di, on the strategy the set
di 2 ½dðKioÞ; d^ðKioÞ.
Proposition 3. Whenever Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, the
simultaneous enforcement game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
where da ¼ d Kao þ K
 
and db ¼ d Kbo
 
if an only if qa Kao þ K;

d Kao þ K
  > qb Kbo þ K; d^ Kbo h i. Otherwise, the game has no pure
strategy equilibrium.
Note that Condition III is not required for Proposition 3 to be ob-
tained. To understand Proposition 3, recall that Kao P K
b
0. When the
difference in capital endowments is sufﬁciently large, even if re-
gion a plays its most preferred enforcement level, region b is not
interested in competing with region a. Investment in law enforce-
ment can simply not compensate for the disadvantage created by
the large asymmetry in capital endowment. Mobile capital locates
in region a, and both regions simply play their most preferred
enforcement levels. Note that the traditional over-enforcement re-
sult disappears, and enforcement is chosen optimally.
When the difference in capital endowments becomes small en-
ough, region b can now potentially ‘‘steal” the mobile capital. A
pure strategy equilibrium no longer exists. If one region makes it-
self attractive by investing in enforcement, then the other region
simply reacts by investing a bit more in enforcement so as to
‘‘steal” the mobile capital. This goes on until region b prefers choos-
ing dðKboÞ instead of competing. Then, region a’s best response be-
comes d Kao þ K
 
, and we are back to where we started with both
regions interested in competing for mobile capital. It is interesting
to note that the absence of a pure strategy equilibrium can be ob-
tained with no speciﬁc formulation of the objective function.
When no pure strategy equilibrium exists, a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists in which both regions randomize according to
a continuous distribution function on the supports da Kao þ K
 
;

d^ Kbo
 
, where region b also plays d Kbo
 
with positive probability.
Marceau et al. (2010) perform a complete analysis of similar games
in the context of tax competition, so the detailed properties of such
equilibria can be found there.13 However, one concern with such a
mixed strategy equilibrium however, is that it is not temporally
consistent. Recall that after the regions have drawn an enforcement
level, mobile capital locates in the most attractive region. However,
regions may want to change their enforcement level ex post, since it
not necessarily optimal given the allocation of capital. Consequently,13 Note that such mixed strategy equilibrium is also reminiscent of the equilibria
characterized in Levitan and Shubik (1972), Varian (1980), or Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983).
14 Beck and Shipley (1989) using data from 11 different states, estimated that more
than 60% of released inmates were re-arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor
within 3 years.
7it makes more sense to think of this enforcement game as a sequen-
tial game, in which one of the two regions ﬁrst selects its enforce-
ment level, and then the other region follows. This has become a
standard assumption in the tax competition literature with
discontinuous capital allocation as in Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
or in Marceau et al. (2010). Whenever qa Kao þ K;d Kao þ K
  
>
qb Kbo þ K; d^ Kbo
 h i
, the same pure Nash equilibrium described in
Proposition 3 is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
any playing order in the sequential game. Proposition 4 describes
what happens for this same game when the difference in capital
endowment is not sufﬁciently large.
Proposition 4. Whenever Conditions I, II, and III are satisﬁed, the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential enforcement game
is characterized by region a receiving all mobile capital for any order of
play. Region b selects d Kbo
 
for any order of play, while region a
selects d Kao þ K
 
if it plays second, and selectsmax ~da; d Kao þ K
 n o
if it plays ﬁrst, where ~da is given by qa Kao þ K; ~da
h i
¼ qb Kboþ
h
K; d^ Kbo
 
.
Consider the ex post implications of such an equilibrium. First,
mobile capital always locates in the jurisdiction initially better en-
dowed in immobile capital. Jurisdiction a who started with higher
welfare continues to beneﬁt from higher welfare after mobile cap-
ital has located within its boundary. The proportion of criminals is
lower because of a larger stock of capital and stronger enforce-
ment. If it plays last, jurisdiction a chooses the optimal enforce-
ment level. If it has to play ﬁrst, however, it has to commit to an
excessive level of law enforcement, unless setting d Kao þ K
 
is al-
ready sufﬁciently high enough to discourage b from even trying to
compete. Jurisdiction b receives no new capital, but it always
chooses the optimal law enforcement effort. Since there is less cap-
ital in this jurisdiction, wages are lower, and more residents choose
to become criminals, leading to a higher crime rate. On the other
hand, jurisdiction a experiences a relatively moderate crime rate
and relatively large output and wage levels. This simple model
can therefore help explain why the welfare levels of two nearby
jurisdictions may not converge.
The relationship we obtain between capital allocation, welfare,
wages and crime rates matches very well with the examples of
twin cities that we discussed in the introduction. These are phe-
nomenas that no other papers have looked at in conjunction. An-
other implication of our model is that the crime rate and the
level of law enforcement are negatively correlated. However, the
actual relationship between crime rates and law enforcement
expenditures is debatable. Many reasons which lie outside of our
model can be responsible for this. For example, in our model,
expenditures on law enforcement are all devoted to the monitoring
of potential infractions, as opposed to investigating crimes. In a pa-
per in which the spatial distribution of crime is not the focus,
Mookherjee and Png (1992) examined the two aformentioned
types of expenditures. They show that with investigating expendi-
tures, more crime inevitably leads to higher costs and/or lower
clearing rates. Thus, if we were to take into consideration investi-
gation activities in our model, the relationship between crime rate
and law enforcement expenditures could be quite different.
Note that when capital is highly mobile and when there are
increasing net returns to capital, at least one region (and possibly
both) sets its enforcement effort efﬁciently. It is interesting to
see that more capital mobility can actually increase aggregate wel-
fare. A similar result is obtained in Marceau et al. (2010) for the
case of tax competition. The combination of sequential play and
increasing net returns on capital means that the ‘‘winner” is ex ante
known, and it serves as a discipline device for the jurisdiction that
cannot win. In fact, even if we were to extend our model to includen jurisdictions, n  1 of them would chose the efﬁcient enforce-
ment level. The jurisdiction with the largest stock of immobile cap-
ital would always succeed to attract all the mobile capital, but it
may have to over-invest in enforcement to do so, depending on
the order of play. All other aspects of our model would remain
the same. We now investigate the implications of a series of more
substantial extensions.
5. Limitations and generalizations
The basic model we presented has the advantage of delivering
clear results concerning the interaction between capital allocation,
crime rate and inter-jurisdictional competition in law enforce-
ment, but obviously many important ingredients that could poten-
tially alter those interactions have been left out. In this section, we
explore the most obvious ones, starting by investigating a dynamic
version of our one-shot game.
5.1. Dynamic
A dynamic version of our model would give a natural interpre-
tation for the initial endowment in capital Kio in period t as simply
being the capital carried over from period t  1. In any given period
t, new mobile capital K would be at stake. The allocation of such
capital would then determine the initial capital for period t + 1,
and so on. On the one hand, if Conditions I and II are not satisﬁed,
the net return on capital across regions will tend to equalize, and
initial capital endowment differences will shrink. On the other
hand, if Conditions I and II are satisﬁed, capital would tend to
agglomerate, and both jurisdictions’ capital endowment would
move apart. As endowments of now immobile capital move apart,
it becomes easier and easier for the prosperous region to attract
new mobile capital. Eventually, endowments could be so far apart
that the pure strategy Nash equilibrium where both regions pick
the efﬁcient enforcement effort becomes unique, as described by
Proposition 3.
Modeling how individuals make their occupational decision is
less obvious however. The easiest way would be to assume that
individuals can choose a new line of activity every period. Wages
and return on criminal activities would always be equalized, and
Conditions I and II would be derived the same way. Alternatively,
one can easily imagine that there exists some degree of time
dependence in the choice individuals make.14 Imagine an overlap-
ping generation model, where individuals make a choice of career
when young based on the relative returns at that time, but are inca-
pable (or capable at some cost) of switching paths later on in their
life. This reﬂects the fact that individuals who embark on a life of
crime have difﬁculty abandoning it or vice versa; this is perhaps
due to the speciﬁcity of human capital. At any point in time, relative
returns may not be equalized. In particular, if the number of new
individuals free to make a choice is too small relative to the stock
of older individuals who have already made one, it would be possible
to observe a gap between the two returns. However, in the long run,
both returns should closely follow each other. Incorporating this fea-
ture in the model, as well as the arrival of new capital, could mean
that Conditions I and II bounce between being satisﬁed and not
being satisﬁed. Jurisdictions could experience periods of conver-
gence and periods of divergence, but all the main features of our
one-period model would remain the same in a such dynamic model.
In the introduction, we mentioned that one interesting property
of our model is that it can replicate the persistence in crime rate we
observe in the data. With a dynamic version of our model, we could
8push this argument farther. In fact, our model could predict from
exogenous initial conditions, which types of cities are going to
experience prosperity and lowcrime rates, and which types of
cities are not going to. San Francisco, for example, has a much low-
er crime rate than Oakland, it also had a much larger initial capital
endowment. Obviously, many counter-examples exist. This, how-
ever, does not necessarily imply that we should reject the basic
mechanism identiﬁed in our model. Imagine a rich dynamic ver-
sion of our model where exogenous shocks are introduced, such
as the destruction of existing capital, the decline of some indus-
tries, or investments coming from higher levels of governments.
All these types of exogenous shock could easily reverse a trend
set by some given initial conditions. Alternatively, one can focus
on the fact that in a dynamic version of our model, crime rates at
the jurisdiction level would be persistent across time, something
that is observable in the data.155.2. Mobility
In the current framework, individuals (criminals and workers)
are immobile. While this assumption considerably simpliﬁes the
analysis, it is important to explore the consequences of relaxing it.
When introducing mobility in such an environment, one needs to
acknowledge that results will be highly sensitive to the set up of
the game, and to the modeling of mobility costs. For example, with-
out moving costs, and with individuals being able to choose where
to operate at the same time as they are making their occupational
decisions, returns across regions and across activities would be
equalized.Without being trivial, one can easily see that the possibil-
ity of an increasing net marginal return on capital q remains, as is
the case under Condition II in the basic model. Indeed, bunching
capital in one regionmaynowgenerate a safer environment through
two mechanisms: (1) more capital may convince more individuals
to become workers, and, (2) more capital may stimulate the migra-
tion of individuals who have a higher likelihood of becoming work-
ers post migration. However, treating occupational decisions on a
par with mobility decisions is, in our opinion, problematic. As was
discussed in Section 5.1, choosing whether to commit a crime or
not is amuchmore important and persistent decision than choosing
where to work, or where to commit a particular infraction. For this
reason, we focus on an alternative timing inwhich individualsmake
their occupational decision ﬁrst, and then migrate if they so desire.
Imagine the following variation on the timing presented in Sec-
tion 2. As before, governments announce enforcement policies di
ﬁrst, and then capital owners, fully anticipating what is to come,
choose where to invest their capital. Next, individuals choose their
occupation based on the relative returns in their own region. Final-
ly, workers and criminals observe the return for a similar activity in
the other region and may choose to migrate if the beneﬁt out-
weighs a migration cost mP 0. Note that when individuals are
making their occupational decisions, they are completely myopic
with regards to their future migration decisions, because of a lack
of information about returns in the other regions for example.16
This assumption is similar to the ‘‘voter myopia” assumption used
in Epple and Romer (1991) and other papers on ‘‘Tiebout sorting”
and voting.17 To clearly understand the difference between workers’
mobility and criminals’ mobility, we analyze both separately and in
turn, starting with that of the workers.
Once government policies have been announced, capital has lo-
cated, and individuals have made their occupational decisions,15 See Stahura and Huff (1986) for example.
16 If they were able to perfectly forecast all returns, all would be equivalent to the
example discussed above in which both decisions are made simultaneously.
17 For a discussion of the related literature, and of the implications of such
assumptions, see Kessler and Lulfesmann (2005).workers in region i who may earn wage FL(Li, Ki), can choose to mi-
grate if this is beneﬁcial. The ﬁnal allocation of workers across re-
gions will be given by
FLðLa þ ‘;KaÞ  FLðLb  ‘;KbÞ ¼ m; ð6Þ
where ‘ represents the number of workers who migrate from one
region to the other.18 Obviously, ‘ is a function of Ka and Kb, as well
as da and db, but also of moving costm. Without moving costs, wages
will be the same in the two regions, but with m > 0, a positive wage
gap will remain. The initial distribution of workers La and Lb is deter-
mined as before. In particular, the initial number of workers La and Lb
are given by Eq. (1), and so Condition I remains the same. If satisﬁed,
an increase in capital would lead to an increase in the workforce.
With Condition I satisﬁed, an increase in capital in region a would
not only cause an increase in La, but also an increase in ‘. Intuitively,
as capital increases, it promotes compliance with the law (Li in-
creases), and at the same time, more individuals migrate to the re-
gion because of higher wages. If Condition I is not satisﬁed, La will
decrease, but ‘ on the other hand will still increase. The same applies
for region b except for the fact that ‘ is decreasing in Kb. Lemma 1
formalizes the idea.
Lemma 1. Workers migration ‘increases with Ka and decreases with
Kb.
We can redeﬁne the net rate of return on capital as
qa = [1  aCa]FK[La + ‘,Ka]. Note that Ca = 1  La, reﬂecting the fact
that criminals do not migrate. Also note that FK depends on La + ‘,
the post migration number of workers in region a. The effect of
Ka on this rate of return is given by:
@qa
@Ka
¼ aFKðÞ @L
a
@Ka
þ ½1 aCa FKKðÞ þ FLKðÞ @Ł
a
@Ki
þ @‘
@Ka
 	
 
: ð7Þ
As we compare the effect capital has on q when workers are
immobile—as given by expression (3)—versus mobile—as given
above—, it becomes clear that capital inﬂuences q in the same
way, except for the additional positive term @‘/@Ka. Assuming
immobile workers, if q is increasing with capital (Condition II sat-
isﬁed), then the rate of return will also be increasing with capital
when workers’ mobility is taken into account. Even if Condition
II is not satisﬁed, q can still be increasing in capital. Consequently,
adding the mobility of workers expands the set of circumstances
under which agglomeration effects are possible. Workers’ mobility
gives additional incentives to bunch capital together, so not only
will more individuals decide to become workers, but also more
workers will migrate to this region.
Workers’ mobility makes it more likely that capital will be
asymmetrically distributed. The more important the asymmetry
in the allocation of capital, the larger the initial wage gap. How-
ever, wages converge to some extent when workers migrate from
one region to the other. The lower mobility costs are, the more sim-
ilar wages will be as more workers will choose to migrate. Finally,
because of this last phenomenon, crime rates will tend to move
even farther apart. The population of criminals will become more
dense in the less favoured region, and less dense in the region that
receives new workers.
We now examine what happens when criminals are mobile and
workers are immobile. With the timing remaining the same, a
criminal in region awould earn aKaFK(La, Ka)  P(da)S, while a crim-
inal in region b would earn aKbFK(Lb, Kb)  P(db)S. Denote by c the
number of criminals who choose to migrate from region a to b.
For c to be well behaved—continuous function—, we assume that18 Note that nothing restricts ‘ from being negative. A negative ‘ implies that
workers are migrating from b to a. However, since our model is perfectly symmetric
except for the fact that Kao P K
b
o , in any type of well coordinated equilibrium, wages in
region a will be at least as large as wages in region b.
9the migration cost m is now uniformly distributed on the support
[ml, mh].19 With a return to crime larger in a than in b, all criminals
with m 6 m will migrate from b to a, where20
m ¼ a½KaFKðLa;KaÞ  KbFKðLb;KbÞ  ½PðdaÞ  PðdbÞS: ð8Þ
From this last expression, it is easy to see that the number of
criminals moving from b to a is given by c ¼ m=ðmh mlÞ.
Lemma 2. Criminals migration c increases with Ka and decreases
with Kb.
An increase in capital in region a increases the return on capital
in this region, and so more criminals ﬁnd it attractive to migrate to
that region. As was done for the case of workers’ mobility, we can
redeﬁne the net rate of return on capital as qa = [1  a(Ca + c)]FK[La,
Ka]. The effect of Ka on this rate of return is given by:
@qa
@Ka
¼ aFKðÞ @L
a
@Ka
 @c
@Ka

 
þ ½1 aCa FKKðÞ þ FLKðÞ @Ł
a
@Ki
þ @‘
@Ka
 	
 
:
ð9Þ
The exact opposite of what we said for workers’ mobility ap-
plies to criminals’ mobility. Whenever Condition II is not satisﬁed,
the return on capital continues to be decreasing in capital. And
even when Condition II is satisﬁed, criminals’ mobility may make
q decreasing in capital because of the mobility effect @c/@Ka. Thus,
having mobile criminals makes it less likely that agglomeration ef-
fects will exist. Criminals migrate where capital goes, so the con-
centration of capital is less attractive.
Governmentpolicies aredecidedasbefore,but inanenvironment
in which net returns on capital are more likely to be decreasing, and
so mobile capital tends to spread out. Because capital is more likely
to be spread out, wages across regions are less likely to be far apart.
Consequently, workers’ versus criminals’ mobility can have
drastically different consequences on the location of capital, wages,
and crime rates. The fact that criminals’ mobility tends to equalize
crime rates and to promote excessive competition between regions
may not be that surprising; a much simpler model, such as that of
Marceau and Mongrain (2002), would generate the same results.
Results concerning workers’ mobility are more interesting in that
sense. Without the interaction between capital allocation and
occupational choice, the results we obtain are less likely to emerge.
This framework of study can also shed some new light on policies
that inﬂuence mobility. For example, improvements in workers’
commuting opportunities may increase disparities in capital and
crime rates. As for the relative importance of workers’ versus crim-
inals’ mobility, this essentially remains an empirical issue. Noonan
(2005), for example, ﬁnds using data from the city of Chicago that
infrastructures such as parks, railroads, and major roads have
strong barrier effects on criminal activity.
The combination of mobility and of some type of heterogeneity
relative to the willingness to be surrounded by crime could make
the asymmetric distribution of capital even more likely. For exam-
ple, in O’Flaherty and Sethi (2010), richer honest individuals leave
city centers to avoid being in contact with street vices; a similar
type of effect in our model would only make agglomeration of cap-
ital more likely.
On a ﬁnal note, our model could easily be modiﬁed to include
skilled and unskilled labor. Imagine that unskilled laborers are
immobile and that they can chose between legal and illegal activ-
ities, as is the case in our basic model. The skilled laborers, on the19 This assumption is required to ensure that migration is not an ‘‘all or nothing”
type of decision. Alternatively, we could have assumed that a is decreasing in the
number of criminals.
20 If the return was to be larger in b instead, then c would then be deﬁned as the
number of criminals migrating from a to b.other hand, are mobile, and have strict preferences for the legal
sector. The production function could take the form of F(K, L, S),
where S and L are the skilled and unskilled laborers. With mobility,
the return to skilled labor FS(K, L, S) will naturally be equalized
across jurisdictions. In this environment, the agglomeration of cap-
ital and low criminality will also lead to the agglomeration of
skilled laborers as long as skilled labor is complementary with cap-
ital and unskilled labor.
5.3. Diversion versus deterrence
There is a large body of literature that examines the problem
faced by multiple agents choosing independently their protection
effort again crime. To name a few, Marceau (1997), Boylan
(2004) andWheaton (2006) look at regional government decisions,
Clotfelter (1978), Shavell (1991), Hui-Wen and Png (1994) or Hotte
and Van Ypersele (2008) concentrate on individual private protec-
tion, while Helsley and Strange (1999) focus on private group pro-
tection taking the form of gated communities. One important
lesson we learned from this literature is that law enforcement
activities (equivalently, private protection) inﬂuence criminality
through different channels, and each different channel leads to
important differences in terms of efﬁciency. More precisely, two
different types of externalities exist, and their consequences are
diametrically opposed. On the one hand, when a region (or an indi-
vidual) invests in law enforcement activities (or private protec-
tion), it can divert crime away into another region (or onto
another individual). This is referred to as the diversion effect of re-
gional law enforcement (or private protection) as discussed in the
papers mentioned above. Because a region does not take into con-
sideration the negative impact diversion has on surrounding re-
gions, law enforcement expenditures will tend to be too high. On
the other hand, investments in law enforcement may also have a
general deterrence effect. Law enforcement efforts in one region
may depress the return to criminal activity enough so that the
overall number of criminals decreases, or equivalently, incarcer-
ated criminals in one region may mean less criminals overall. Con-
sequently, law enforcement in one region can also create a positive
externality, meaning that expenditures will tend to be too low.
As far as the basic version of our model is concerned, it is inter-
esting to note that neither of these two externalities are present.
Since criminals are assumed to be immobile, the diversion exter-
nality is simply not present. Similarly, because all the beneﬁts of
deterrence are conﬁned to the region itself, all beneﬁts in term of
lower crime rates are consequently internalized. The reason why
we still get over-investments in law enforcement is due to an
externality similar to that which exists in the tax competition liter-
ature with mobile capital. By making its region safer, a local gov-
ernment beneﬁts from an inﬂow of mobile capital, and because it
does not take into consideration the outﬂow of capital from other
regions, it invests too much in law enforcement.
When we relax our initial assumptions as in the previous sub-
section and allow for criminals’ mobility, both types of externali-
ties mentioned above become relevant. On the one hand, law
enforcement competition becomes more intense as regions can
also reduce crime rates by inﬂuencing the migration of criminals.
Over deterrence becomes a more salient problem, and it increases
t^ and t, as governments have an additional incentive to invest in
law enforcement. On the other hand, law enforcement by any of
the two regions reduces the total number of criminals, and so
the positive externality associated with deterrence is present. Con-
sequently, as some of the papers mentioned above pointed out, law
enforcement may be over- or under-provided. However, because of
the additional externality created by the ﬂow of capital, it is more
likely to be over-provided as compared to what is obtained in the
previous literature.
105.4. Appropriation technology
It is also relevant to discuss our modeling of the appropriation
technology. In our basic model, we assume that each criminal
steals a constant fraction a of the return on capital or ‘‘booty”,
regardless of law enforcement choices, of the number of other
criminals, or of the size of the ‘‘booty” itself. In the context of our
model, a could easily be a negative function of law enforcement
and all our results would remain qualitatively the same. Law
enforcement would, in addition to having a deterrence effect, have
a protection effect as well. In fact, we could completely replace
sanctioning by pure protection only, and our results would still
be qualitatively the same. As discussed in Helsley and Strange
(1999), sanctions and protection have similar effects on criminals’
behavior. At a lower value of a, crime becomes less attractive. The
only signiﬁcant difference is that protection, on top of deterring
crime, can also reduce crime severity. This does not alter the gov-
ernment’s decisions signiﬁcantly. However, it does increase the
marginal beneﬁt of law enforcement.
Another natural assumption, found in Freeman et al. (1996) or
Helsley and Strange (1999), would be to suppose that a(C) depends
negatively on the number of criminals due to a congestion effect.
Eq. (1) describing occupational choices L(Ki, di) would become:
FLðLi;KiÞ ¼ að1 LiÞKiFKðLi;KiÞ  PðdiÞS: ð10Þ
Condition I stating when additional capital makes working
more attractive would remain the same, but the denominator of
@L(Ki, di)/@Ki would be larger. This implies that whether or not
additional capital deters crime follows the same restriction as be-
fore, but if it does, the effect would be smaller. Intuitively, if more
capital reduces the number of criminals, then the beneﬁt to each
remaining criminals goes up, prompting more people to become
criminals. The same applies if capital increases the number of crim-
inals. The beneﬁts of each crime would go down due to the conges-
tion effect, and so crime would become less attractive. Because
@L(Ki, di)/@Ki needs to be positive, but also large enough for the
agglomeration effect to exist, introducing congestion would render
this agglomeration effect less likely.
Finally, the proportion of the ‘‘booty” stolen by a criminal could
be a decreasing function of the ‘‘booty” itself, as would be the case
if private protection was taken into account. Eq. (1) would then
become:
FLðLi;KiÞ ¼ a½KiFKðLi;KiÞKiFKðLi;KiÞ  PðdiÞS; ð11Þ
where a[KiFK(Li, Ki)] would be decreasing with KiFK(Li, Ki). This
would implies that the right hand side of Eq. (11) is no longer nec-
essarily increasing with capital. As noted by Hotte and Van Ypersele
(2008) and others, if private protection is sufﬁciently elastic with
respect to what there is to protect, the return to crime may be
decreasing with the size of the ‘‘booty”. Consequently, the modiﬁed
Condition I would simply become more easily satisﬁed as it would
require that FLK()P [a() + a0()][FK() + KiFKK()], and as a direct con-
sequence, the agglomeration effect would be more likely to emerge.
This paper has shown that in an economy with occupational
choice and with jurisdictions competing in enforcement to attract
mobile capital, the equilibrium may result in an uneven distribu-
tion of crime and capital across space. When new capital stimu-
lates strong upward pressure on wages, the jurisdiction that is
initially better endowed with capital has an advantage in attracting
new capital, while the other is left with a much higher crime rate.
Equilibrium outcomes may or not may be efﬁcient. The creation of
a central organization to coordinate law enforcement policies
could be beneﬁcial in such a context, depending on the constraints
it faces and the strengths and weaknesses of centralization. For
example, a central organization may be forced, by political con-straints, to select a uniform level of enforcement in all jurisdic-
tions. Also, it could be that a central agency is not as efﬁcient at
identifying criminals. To analyze the opportunity of creating such
a central agency, our model would have to be extended to take
these factors into account.
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Proof of Proposition 1. When @Li(Ki, di)/@Ki = 0, i = a, b, it follows
from Eq. (3) that @qi/@Ki < 0, i = a, b. In such a case, mobile capital is
allocated between the two jurisdictions until the per unit return is
equalized. Consequently, K(da, db) satisﬁes Eq. (4), which simply
states that qa½Kao þ Kðda; dbÞ ¼ qb½Kbo þ K  Kðda; dbÞ. Differentiat-
ing Eq. (4) yields that:
@Kðda; dbÞ
@da
¼ a
0ðdaÞCaFKðÞ  ½aFKðÞ þ ð1 aCaÞFLKðÞ@La=@da
½1 aCaFKK La;Kao þ Ka
 þ ½1 aCbFKK Lb;KBo þ Kb 
@Kðda; dbÞ
@db
¼ a
0ðdbÞCbFKðÞ þ ½aFKðÞ þ ð1 aCbÞFLKðÞ@Lb=@db
½1 aCaFKKðLb;Kao þ KaÞ þ ½1 aCbFKKðLb;Kbo þ KbÞ
The denominator of these two expressions is clearly negative.
Consequently, @K(da, db)/@da is positive since its numerator is neg-
ative, and @K(da, db)/@db is negative since its numerator is positive.
Similarly, when @Li(Ki, di)/@Ki < 0, i = a, b, it follows from Eq. (3)
that @qi/@Ki < 0, i = a, b. In such a case, mobile capital is allocated
between the two jurisdictions until the per unit return is equalized.
Consequently, K(da, db) satisﬁes Eq. (4), which simply states that
qa½Kao þ Kðda; dbÞ ¼ qb½Kbo þ K  Kðda; dbÞ. Totally differentiating
Eq. (4) yields that:
@Kðda; dbÞ
@da
¼ ½aFKðÞ þ ð1 aC
aÞFKLðÞ@La=@da
D
;
@Kðda; dbÞ
@db
¼ ½aFKðÞ þ ð1 aC
bÞFKLðÞ@Lb=@db
D
;
where
D ¼ aFKðÞð@LaðÞ=@KaÞ þ ½1 aCaðÞ½FKKðÞ þ FKLðÞð@LaðÞ=@KaÞ
þ aFKðÞð@LbðÞ=@KbÞ þ ½1 aCb½FKKðÞ þ FKLðÞð@LbðÞ=@KbÞ:
The denominator of these two expressions is clearly negative.
Consequently, @K(da, db)/@da is positive since its numerator is neg-
ative, and @K(da, db)/@db is negative since its numerator is positive.
Derivation of Condition II: For @qi/@Ki > 0, the following must be
satisﬁed:
aFK
@Li
@Ki
þ ½1 aCi FKK þ FLK @L
i
@Ki
" #
> 0:
11This is equivalent to:
@Li
@Ki
>
FKK
a
1aC FK þ FKL
:
Therefore, using Eq. (2), we can show that @qi/@Ki > 0 if and only
if:
aCiFKL > a½FK þ KiFKK  þ 1 aC
i
a
FLLFKK  F2KL
FK
:
As a way to ease the exposition, we use the corresponding suf-
ﬁcient condition
aCiFKL > a½FK þ KiFKK  þ FLLFKK  F
2
KL
aFK
;
as Condition II. h
Proof of Proposition 2. When Conditions I and II are both
satisﬁed, then @qi/@Ki is positive for all values of Ki. Since the per
unit return on capital is increasing in K in both jurisdictions, we
either have qaj Ka¼KaoþKð Þ P q
bjðKb¼Kbo Þ or q
aj Ka¼Kaoð Þ 6 q
bjðKb¼KboþKÞ. If
all capitalists invest in the jurisdiction with the highest return, it is
optimal for a given capitalist to also invest in that jurisdiction.
Consequently, there exist at least one equilibrium in which all
capital locates in a single jurisdiction. In particular, if
qaj Ka¼KaoþKð Þ P q
bj Kb¼Kboð Þ there exist an equilibrium where all
mobile capital goes to a, and if qaj Ka¼Kaoð Þ 6 q
bj Kb¼KboþKð Þ there exist
an equilibrium where all mobile capital goes to b. hProof of Corollary 1. Given Kao ¼ Kbo , then qaj Ka¼Kaoð Þ > qbj Kb¼Kboð Þ if
and only if da > db. Consequently, there exist an equilibrium where
the entire K is invested in a. Given that the per unit return on cap-
ital is increasing in capital, this equilibrium dominates any other
allocation. When db > da, it must be that qajðKa¼KaoÞ < qbj Kb¼Kboð Þ,
therefore an equilibrium exist where the entire K is invested in
b. When da = db, then qajðKa¼KaoÞ ¼ qbjðKb¼KboÞ. The capitalists are then
indifferent between investing all their capital in a or b. hProof of Corollary 2. The proof of Corollary 2 is identical to that of
Corollary 1, but with varying K instead of varying d. hProof of Proposition 3. When qa Kao þ K; d Kao þ K
  
> qb Kboþ
h
K; d^ Kbo
 
, playing d Kao þ K
 
is a dominant strategy for region a.
Then, the best response for region b is to play d Kbo
 
. However,
when qa Kao þ K; d Kao þ K
  
6 qb Kbo þ K; d^ Kbo
 h i
there is no pure
strategy equilibrium.
For any db such that qb Kbo þ K; db
h i
> qa Kao þ K; d Kao þ K
  
, all
mobile capital would locate in region b. Region a would beneﬁt
from setting da such that qa Kao þ K; da
 
is just above
qb Kbo þ K; db
h i
. The same applies for region b until db is such that
X Kbo þ K; db
h i
< X Kbo; d
 Kbo
 h i
. Note that the same is true for a,
but since Kbo < K
a
o this always happen at a lower level of enforce-
ment level for b than for a. Consequently, capital locates in region
a, and region b would prefer playing its most prefer enforcement
level is dðKboÞ. However, if region b pick d Kbo
 
, region amost pre-
fer enforcement level would be the maximum between d Kbo þ K
 
and a level of enforcement high enough to make sure that
qa Kao þ K; da
 
is just above qb Kbo þ K; db
h i
. Finally, if region a pick
d Kbo þ K
 
(or a level of enforcement high enough to make surethat qa Kao þ K; da
 
is just above qb Kbo þ K; db
h i
), then region b
would be better playing db such that qb½Kbo þ K; db is just above
qa Kao þ K; da
 
, and we are back to the ﬁrst situation described
above. Consequently, there are no pure Nash equilibrium. h
Proof of Proposition 4. If region a plays ﬁrst, it will pick ~da such
that qa½Kao þ K; ~da ¼ qb½Kbo þ K; d^ðKboÞ unless ~da < dðKao þ KÞ, in
which case region a picks dðKao þ KÞ. Jurisdiction b best response
is then to play dðKboÞ, and mobile capital locates itself in a. If region
b plays ﬁrst, it will pick dðKboÞ, as no level bellow d^ðKboÞ can prevent
region a from proﬁtably attracting mobile capital. Jurisdiction a
best response is then to play dðKao þ hÞ, and capital locates itself in
a.Proof of Lemma 1. Migration outcome ‘ is determined by Eq. (6).
From this equation we can derive that
@‘
@Ka
¼  FKLðL
a þ ‘;KaÞ þ FLLðLa þ ‘;KaÞ @La@Ka
FLLðLa þ ‘;KaÞ þ FLLðLb  ‘;KbÞ
:
Wewill now show that FKLðÞ þ FLLðÞ @La@Ka is positive. If we expand
this expression, we can see that it is positive if and only if
FKLðÞ > FLLðÞaKaFLKðÞ  FLLðÞ
ðFLKðÞ  a½FKðÞ þ KaFKKðÞÞ;
which is satisﬁed. The same can be shown for ‘ when Kb
changes. hProof of Lemma 2. The outcome of migration is given by
c ¼ m=ðmh mlÞ, therefore we need to show that m is increasing
in Ka. From Eq. (8) we get that
@ m
@Ka
¼ a½FKðLa;KaÞ þ KaFKKðLa;KaÞ þ aKaFKLðLa;KaÞ @L
a
@Ka
> 0:
Similarly, we can show that c decreases with Kb. hReferences
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